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OPINION OF THE COURT

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Appellants, USX Corporation and the Bessemer and Lake
Erie Railroad Company, sued the reorganized Penn Central
Transportation Company (now known as American Premier
Underwriters, Inc.) for contribution and indemnity based on Penn
Central's participation with them in an antitrust conspiracy.
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Although appellants were held liable for nearly $600 million in
damages from that conspiracy, see In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore
Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1993), the courts ruled
that the direct claims against Penn Central were barred by its
reorganization.
In response to the underlying lawsuit for contribution
and indemnity, Penn Central filed a petition in its bankruptcy
case to require the dismissal of the suit, alleging that the 1978
Consummation Order and Final Decree barred it.
court granted the petition.

The district

In re Penn Central Transp. Co., No.

70-347 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1994).

We will reverse.

I.
The Penn Central bankruptcy proceeding is more than a
quarter-century old; and the facts of the antitrust conspiracy
are even older.

Andrew Carnegie built the Bessemer to link his

Pittsburgh-area steel mills to raw materials sources,
specifically iron ore, received from ore ships at Lake Erie
ports.

The railroad was a wholly-owned subsidiary of United

States Steel Corporation (now USX Corporation) until 1989, when
it was spun off.

USX, however, retained liability for the

antitrust claims at issue under its indemnity agreement with the
Bessemer.
Beginning in 1956, the Bessemer and several other
railroads, including the Penn Central's predecessors, entered
into a joint ratemaking agreement, which was given limited
immunity from antitrust attack under § 5(a) of the Reed-Bulwinkle
Act, ch. 491, 62 Stat. 472 (1948).
3

In 1970, the Penn Central

filed a bankruptcy petition under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898.

This action, and the bankruptcies of several other

regional railroads, motivated Congress to pass the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act of 1973, under which the Penn Central conveyed
its rail assets to Conrail in 1976.

In 1978, the district court

entered its Final Decree and Consummation Order, which included a
limitation or bar date for all claims against the debtor.

The

Consummation Order transferred the reorganized Penn Central's
railroad property and discharged it from any further claims
predicated upon its pre-consummation acts or conduct.

The

district court retained jurisdiction over any claims that might
later be asserted against Penn Central.
In 1980, Pinney Dock and Litton filed antitrust
complaints against the Bessemer, Penn Central and other
railroads.

The claims against Penn Central were held barred by

the discharge.

In re Penn Central Transp. Co. ("Pinney Dock"),

42 B.R. 657, 676 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 762 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1033, 106 S. Ct. 596 (1985).

Between 1982

and 1984, several plaintiffs filed suits under federal and Ohio
antitrust law against the signatories to the § 5(a) agreement,
including Penn Central and the Bessemer.
consolidated as the "MDL 587" litigation.

These claims were
The district court

dismissed Penn Central as a defendant, concluding that because
the claims arose pre-consummation they were discharged.

All

remaining defendants except the Bessemer settled with plaintiffs.
The Bessemer went to trial and lost.

Judgment was entered

against it in excess of $592 million, and paid by USX.
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The

Bessemer and USX then filed complaints in federal and Ohio courts
seeking indemnity and contribution from Penn Central, as the
instigator, enforcer and primary beneficiary of the conspiracy.
II.
The predicate conduct of appellants' antitrust
liability began before Penn Central filed its bankruptcy
petition.

Thus, Penn Central asserts that appellants' claims

against it have been discharged by the Consummation Order and
Final Decree.

Appellants argue, however, that their claims

seeking contribution and indemnity could not possibly have been
filed before the 1978 bar date, because they were not sued until
later; and, hence should be treated as post-consummation claims,
i.e., neither discharged nor barred.
A.
We look to nonbankruptcy law to determine when these
claims accrued.

See Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758

F.2d 936, 941 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864, 106 S. Ct.
183 (1985); In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332, 335 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160, 105 S. Ct. 911 (1985).

We

agree with appellants that their claims for contribution and
indemnity could not accrue until the MDL 587 complaints were
filed against them between 1982 and 1984.

In Frenville, applying

New York law, we opined that:
For both separate actions and
third-party complaints, a claim for
contribution or indemnification does not
accrue at the time of the commission of the
underlying act, but rather at the time of the
payment of the judgment flowing from the act.
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744 F.2d at 337.
law.

The MDL 587 claims arose under federal and Ohio

That law, for our purposes at least, is consistent with the

law applied in Frenville.

For example, the Ohio Supreme Court

has stated that
the right to contribution is inchoate from
the time of the creation of the relationship
giving rise to the common burden until the
payment by a co-obligor of more than his
proportional share, and . . . the right
becomes complete and enforceable only upon a
payment by the claimant extinguishing the
whole of the common obligation.
National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Whitmer, 435 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (Ohio
1982); see Ross v. Spiegel, Inc., 373 N.E.2d 1288, 1295 (Ohio
App. 1977) (similar rule for indemnity).

Applying federal

admiralty law, we reached a similar conclusion.

See Sea-Land

Serv., Inc. v. United States, 874 F.2d 169, 171 (3d Cir. 1989).
B.
That conclusion frames the issue that was before the
district court and is now before us: whether a claim that arose
after the 1978 Consummation Order was nevertheless discharged by
that order.

We have already answered that question in the

negative, at least in the context of the § 77 reorganization
presented by this case.1

1

Indeed, our holding today was foreshadowed two decades ago in
the § 77 case of In re Reading Co., 404 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa.
1975), which involved similar facts. There, the court held that
claims for contribution and indemnity asserted against a bankrupt
railroad were not prepetition in nature--even though the facts
giving rise to primary liability occurred before the railroad
declared bankruptcy--because the railroad settled with the
plaintiff post-bankruptcy and only then did the cause of action
for contribution and indemnity accrue. Id. at 1251.
6

In Schweitzer,2 plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos
during their employment with the Reading Railroad and the Central
Railroad of New Jersey.

Later, but before plaintiffs' injuries

manifested themselves, these railroads consummated a
reorganization under § 77.

When plaintiffs discovered their

injuries, they filed FELA actions against Conrail, which had
succeeded to the former railroads' rail assets.
Conrail argued that the consummation order discharged
any claims asserted by the injured workers, but we disagreed,
noting first "that plaintiffs' rights only could have been
affected by the discharge of all 'claims' against their employer
if they had 'claims' within the meaning of section 77 prior to
the consummation date of their employer's reorganization."
at 941.

Id.

We concluded "that if plaintiffs had causes of action

that existed under FELA prior to the relevant consummation dates
they had 'claims.'"Id.

We then analyzed plaintiffs' claims under

FELA and concluded that no cause of action accrued until the
manifestation of plaintiffs' injuries.

Id. at 942.

This case is analogous to Schweitzer.

Like the

subclinical injuries there, appellants here had no cause of
action against Penn Central pre-consummation.

Because they could

not have filed this action during the Penn Central bankruptcy,

2

See also In re Central R.R. Co., 950 F.2d 887,
1991) (following Schweitzer), cert. denied, 503
Ct. 1586 (1992); Zulkowski v. Consolidated Rail
73, 74 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
559 (1988).
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892 (3d Cir.
U.S. 971, 112 S.
Corp., 852 F.2d
994, 109 S. Ct.

Schweitzer's lesson is that their claims could not have been
discharged.
Penn Central argues that appellants had preconsummation, contingent, and dischargeable claims.

It relies on

our discussion in Schweitzer of the early § 77B case of In re
Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp. ("RKO"), 106 F.2d 22 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 622, 60 S. Ct. 377 (1939).

We find that case to

be inapposite.
In RKO, landlords leased property to a corporation's
subsidiary, on condition that the parent corporation guarantee
rent payments.

When the parent went bankrupt, the subsidiary was

still paying rent.

The landlords did not file a claim against

the bankrupt's estate.

But after the debtor's reorganization

when the subsidiary defaulted, they asserted that their claim on
the guarantee was not discharged.

The Court of Appeals

disagreed:
The appellants . . . were not as [a] matter
of law entitled to stand aloof and obtain a
continuance of the guaranties unaffected by
reorganization, the equivalent of a
preference for them over unsecured creditors
with accrued or determinable claims. What
they were entitled to was treatment as nearly
like that accorded to ordinary unsecured
creditors as the circumstances permitted[.]
Id. at 26-27.
Penn Central maintains that appellants here stand in
the same position as the landlords in RKO.

Schweitzer, however,

counsels otherwise;
The reasoning in Radio-Keith-Orpheum is
not controlling here, however, because we do
not believe plaintiffs had "interests" of any
8

character before injury manifested itself. In
our view, before one can have an "interest"
which is cognizable as a contingent claim
under section 77, one must have a legal
relationship relevant to the purported
interest from which that interest may flow.
In Radio-Keith-Orpheum, although there
had been no breach of the lease agreement and
thus there was no present cause of action
pursuant to the guaranties, there was a
guarantor-guarantee legal relationship from
which an interest in the guaranty could
flow.3 There is no legal relationship,
however, between a tortfeasor and a tort
victim until a tort actually has occurred. .
. .
758 F.2d at 943 (citation omitted).
Undaunted, Penn Central asserts that the § 5(a)
agreement to which the Bessemer was a party takes this case out
of the ambit of Schweitzer and places it squarely within the
holding of RKO.

We cannot agree.

The key to Schweitzer's

treatment of RKO was that the RKO landlords had explicitly
bargained to look to the unreorganized debtor for their security.
Here, however, the § 5(a) agreement confers no right of
indemnification.

That agreement, although the source of

appellants' primary liability to the MDL 587 plaintiffs, simply
does not evidence an intent to look to the pre-reorganized Penn
Central for contribution or indemnity claims.
3

Put simply,

Accord Frenville, 744 F.2d at 336 ("The present case is
different from one involving an indemnity or surety contract.
When parties agree in advance that one party will indemnify the
other party in the event of a certain occurrence, there exists a
right to payment, albeit contingent, Such a surety relationship
is the classic case of a contingent right to payment under the
Code--the right to payment exists as of the signing of the
agreement, but it is dependent on the occurrence of a future
event." (Citations omitted.)).
9

although there was a legal relationship between the Bessemer and
the Penn Central's predecessors, there was no legal relationship
from which a prepetition interest in contribution or indemnity
could flow.

See id. at 943.

This conclusion is supported by the § 77 case of In re
Penn Central Transp. Co. ("Paoli Yard"), 944 F.2d 164 (3d Cir.
1991).

Penn Central and its predecessors operated a railroad

yard on an electrified portion of its line.

The land became

contaminated from PCBs common in the electrical transformers of
the period.

As part of the Penn Central reorganization, the

Paoli Yard was conveyed to Conrail, and later to SEPTA.

Two

years post-consummation, however, Congress imposed retroactive
liability on former owners of toxic waste sites. The United
States sued both SEPTA and Conrail, and Conrail sought
contribution and indemnity from the reorganized Penn Central. Id.
at 165-66.
The district court, construing Schweitzer narrowly,
held that the Consummation Order barred the claims against the
reorganized Penn Central. Id. at 166.

We reversed, noting first

that
at the moment of the bankruptcy discharge and
the inception of the injunction, CERCLA had
not yet been passed by Congress. Indeed
CERCLA was not enacted until 1980.
Consequently, at the time of the Consummation
Order, there was no statutory basis for
liability to be asserted against [Penn
Central] by the petitioners. Just as the
employees in Schweitzer had no recognizable
tort causes of action under the FELA prior to
the employer railroad's relevant consummation
dates, the petitioners here could not have
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brought claims under CERCLA prior to the
Consummation Date.
Id. at 167.

We then went on to reject the theory that a

contingent, dischargeable claim existed pre-consummation:
Under the facts now before us in this appeal,
it was not until the passage of CERCLA that a
legal relationship was created between the
petitioners and [Penn Central] relevant to
the petitioners' potential causes of action
such that an interest could flow. Because
this legal relationship did not evolve until
after the Consummation Date, the petitioners
did not have contingent claims against [Penn
Central]. Accordingly, our decision in
Schweitzer leads us to the conclusion that
the petitioners' asserted claims under CERCLA
did not constitute dischargeable claims
within the meaning of section 77 and thus
survive the discharge of the debtor.
Id. at 167-68 (emphasis added).
In Paoli Yard, we made explicit what was implicit in
Schweitzer: it is not sufficient for dischargeability purposes
that there was some pre-consummation legal relationship between
the debtor and the party seeking now to assert a claim; rather,
that relationship must be relevant to the claimant's cause of
action.

When CERCLA was enacted, two fundamental changes

occurred in that relationship: first, Conrail became primarily
liable for the toxic waste cleanup.

Second, and more importantly

for our purposes, CERCLA made Penn Central potentially liable to
Conrail for contribution and indemnity.

Only then did a legal

relationship relevant to the cause of action arise.4
4

Likewise, in Schweitzer, there was undoubtedly an employeremployee contractual relationship between the railroads and the
injured workers. That relationship, by itself, was not
sufficiently relevant to their tort claims that the workers
11

Although not necessary to our holding, Frenville also
supports our conclusion that appellants' claims against the
reorganized Penn Central were not discharged.

In that case,

banks sued an accounting firm for negligently preparing the
debtor's financial statements.

The firm sought relief from the

automatic stay to claim contribution and indemnity from the
debtor.

744 F.2d at 333-34.

We held that, because the firm's

claims for contribution and indemnity could not accrue until the
banks sued the firm, the firm's claims arose post-petition and
were nondischargeable; hence, the automatic stay was
inapplicable.

Id. at 337.

Frenville, of course, arose under the Bankruptcy Code,
not § 77 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.

Key to our analysis in

Frenville was the definition of "claim" as a "right to payment"
in 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), which we held was intended by Congress to
be interpreted broadly.

See id. at 336.

Penn Central seizes on

this distinction and urges us not to apply Frenville to this § 77
case.

This, however, is a distinction without a difference.

Section 77(b) of the 1898 Act defined "claims" as "debts" or
"other interests of whatever character."

In neither brief nor

argument could counsel for Penn Central explain how these two
definitions differ and why that difference should lead us to a
5

different result here than in Frenville.

somehow agreed to look only to the debtors' estates for
compensation.
5
In response to Penn Central's argument that Frenville was
wrongly decided and has not been well received by courts outside
the Third Circuit, we direct its attention to Third Circuit
Internal Operating Procedure 9.1.
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Our holding makes for sound policy.

Appellants could

not have been expected to file a contingent claim preconsummation based on the speculative possibility that their
conduct, which began in the 1950s, might have extended beyond the
bounds of its statutory antitrust immunity and that they might
successfully be sued years later.

If the Bessemer were required

to act with such clairvoyance, then countless other entities that
did business with the Penn Central and its predecessors, would
also have been required to file contingent claims.

Affixing

value to these claims, both individually and in the aggregate,
would be impossible, and the uncertainty thus created would
render any reorganization plan unworkable.

Indeed, we find the

Schweitzer analysis of when asbestos-caused disease claims accrue
both analogous and persuasive:
If mere exposure to asbestos were sufficient
to give rise to a F.E.L.A. cause of action,
countless seemingly healthy railroad workers,
workers who might never manifest injury,
would have tort claims cognizable in federal
court. It is obvious that proof of damages
in such cases would be highly speculative,
likely resulting in windfalls for those who
never take ill and insufficient compensation
for those who do.
758 F.2d at 942.
C.
As a final ground for affirmance, Penn Central argues
that, as a matter of law, appellants have no valid claims for
indemnity or contribution.

This argument, however, goes to the

merits of appellants' indemnity and contribution claims currently
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pending in other courts, which will proceed there once our
mandate issues.

Hence, we do not reach the issue.
III.

Because appellants' claims against Penn Central arose
post-consummation and were not discharged, we will reverse and
remand the cause for the district court to deny Penn Central's
petition.
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